Price interactions between theme park and tour operator by Song, H et al.
Tourism Economics, 2009, 15 (4), 813–824
Price interactions between theme park
and tour operator
HAIYAN SONG
School of Hotel and Tourism Management, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University,
Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong, PR China. E-mail: hmsong@polyu.edu.hk.
SHU YANG
School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, PR China.
E-mail: yangs3@mail.ustc.edu.cn.
GEORGE Q. HUANG
Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Systems Engineering, University of Hong
Kong, Hong Kong, PR China. E-mail: gqhuang@hku.hk.
This paper conducts a theoretical investigation into pricing
competition and coordination between Hong Kong Disneyland (HKD)
and a tour operator. HKD supplies two types of admission ticket to
the tour operator: an admission-only ticket and a package ticket that
combines admission to the park and one night’s accommodation in
its hotels. The tour operator then sells these two types of admission
ticket in the target market. A Stackelberg game model is proposed
to formulate the leader–follower relationship, with HKD leading and
the tour operator following. The equilibrium prices are derived by
backward induction. The theoretical results show that HKD can
coordinate with the tour operator through a quantity discount
schedule. A Nash bargaining game suggests that HKD receives a
larger share of the profit growth due to its dominant market power.
Keywords: Hong Kong Disneyland; tour operators; Stackelberg game;
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Hong Kong Disneyland (HKD) is the first world-class theme park in China
and has been recognized as a key milestone in the development of the Hong
Kong economy. Apart from providing a fantastic experience for visitors through
four wondrous themes, the park also owns two themed hotels at the resort,
which further enhance visitors’ Disney experience. Since its opening in
September 2005, HKD has attracted millions of visitors worldwide each year,
especially those from mainland China. According to the report released by
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HKD, mainland visitors made up almost 40% of the attendance in 2007 and
increased to about 50% in the first month of 2008.
Chinese tourists normally take package tours, as compared to Western
tourists (Wong and Lau, 2001). Therefore, a large proportion of the visitors
from mainland China travel to Hong Kong through package tours (Wang et
al, 2000). The package tours sold by tour operators or their branches typically
consist of a visit to HKD, one night’s accommodation or more in Hong Kong
and shopping experiences in such mega shopping malls as Times Square, Pacific
Places and Harbor City.
Undoubtedly, tour operators have acted as agents in promoting HKD and
its two hotels to the source markets. ‘Our travel industry partners play an
integral role in broadening our reach to . . . our overseas visitors with access
to a wide range of packages that promote Hong Kong and Hong Kong
Disneyland’, said Roy Tan Hardy, HKD Vice President of Sales and Marketing
(http://www.hongkongdisneyland.com/eng/discover/index.html). The park has
increased contractual tour operators from 50 to 130 since its opening.
Although HKD and tour operators both benefit from the sale of the services
provided by HKD, a variety of conflicts have arisen as each of them has their
own interests. The conflicts evidently emerge from two major sources. First,
due to consumer budget constraints, tour operators and HKD naturally compete
directly for a share of the market (Medina-Muñoz et al, 2003). The success of
one is seen ultimately as taking profit away from the other. Secondly, the room
rates of themed hotels operated by HKD are much higher than those of other
hotels with the same star rating. Therefore, the majority of tourists prefer the
cheaper alternatives provided by tour operators that allow them to visit
Disneyland and stay at other hotels. To achieve high room occupancy rates of
its hotels, HKD requires tour operators to make every effort in promoting and
selling its services rather than offering alternative, cheaper accommodation.
Therefore, it is important that HKD develops a mechanism that aligns the
objectives of the two parties and coordinates the tour operators’ activities to
optimize overall performance.
Our interest in the topic was sparked by this cooperation and conflict
relationship between HKD and its channel partners (tour operators). We are
interested in answering the following questions: How do HKD and tour
operators design their pricing strategies? How can HKD influence the market
demand for its products? Do HKD and tour operators have any incentive to
coordinate their operations to achieve high profitability and, if so, how? How
would HKD and tour operators divide the profit based on their bargaining
powers?
Game theory is a powerful tool in studying cooperation and conflict between
different players in business games (Owen, 1982). It has been recognized by
researchers as a convenient analytical method that improves the comprehension
of firms’ interactions and their outcomes (Sinclair and Stabler, 1997). For
example, Wie (2005) builds an N-person non-cooperative dynamic game to
investigate the strategic capacity investment in the cruise industry. Wachsman
(2006) presents a Nash game model to formulate strategic interactions among
hotels and airlines. Pan (2006) proposes a Nash bargaining model to study the
average daily rate per rented hotel room.
This paper proposes a Stackelberg game (sequential game) model to
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formulate the relationship between HKD and a tour operator. In this tourism
system, only one tour operator is selected and considered for simplicity, but
without loosing generality. The same principle could be extended easily to
situations where multiple tour operators are involved. Both HKD and the tour
operator are assumed to be profit maximizers. In this system, HKD is
considered as the industry leader that dominates the market because all package
holidays are assumed to include a tour to HKD. In this sequential game, HKD
first specifies the prices of its services and the tour operator, as the follower,
then decides the prices of the corresponding package tours. Equilibriums of the
leader–follower game are solved through backward induction. The tour operator
makes its move first to determine the optimal prices of package tours. Then,
HKD learns the decisions of the tour operator and prices its services to
maximize its profit.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a
Stackelberg game model and its equilibrium solutions. The subsequent section
assesses the coordination between the two players through a quantity discount
schedule offered by HKD to the tour operator. The paper concludes with some
suggestions for further research.
The game model
Tourism utility
This section considers a simple scenario in which HKD sells its admission
tickets through a tour operator. Two basic services are provided by HKD: park
visit and hotel accommodation. Thus, HKD offers two types of tickets to the
tour operator. One is an admission-only ticket to the park and the other is a
combined package ticket that includes both park admission and
accommodation. The tour operator then packages these two types of admission
tickets with other services like shopping and sightseeing as package tours and
sells the two corresponding package tours to tourists.
The first package tour includes a visit to the park, a one-night stay in one
of the hotels operated by HKD and other tourism activities. It is reasonable
to assume that the factors that affect tourists’ choice of this package tour include
the following. First, the HKD hotels are usually near the park, which is
convenient for tourists who want to spend more time in the park. Second, the
hotels are designed with the same or similar themes as the park and offer a
different experience for tourists besides visiting the park. Third, the hotels
provide additional services to park visitors, which can further enhance their
recreational experiences. For example, HKD has designed many special
activities and facilities in its hotels, such as storytelling and movie watching
for children. Fourth, due to imperfect information, tourists tend to have more
confidence in the HKD brand, even though other hotels may provide similar
services. All these additional services and facilities incur costs and lead to a
higher package price. Therefore, this package tour will only be suitable for those
tourists who are more concerned about experience and are willing to pay a
premium for such experience.
Alternatively, if tourists are price sensitive, they will choose the cheaper
package tour, in which tourists can be accommodated in other hotels arranged
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by the tour operator with similar quality but low prices. Those hotels are
normally located far away from the park and tourists have to spend additional
time travelling to the park. Moreover, those hotels are independent of the park
and are unlikely to provide any additional recreation experience, as compared
with the Disneyland hotels.
For convenience of discussion, the package tour that includes both park
admission and accommodation is denoted as a luxury package, while the one
that excludes the HKD accommodation is denoted as an economy package.1 The
experience of tourists and the prices of the package tours are denoted si and
pi, respectively; i = (L, E) where L stands for the luxury package tour and E
stands for the economy package tour. It is reasonable to assume that sL > sE and
pL > pE. Moreover, we note ∆S = sL – sE, reflecting the difference in tourism
experience with the two different package tours.
Different tourists have different preferences for the package tours offered by
the tour operator. We represent this preference by θ. Parameter θ is a random
variable following a uniform distribution normalized to [0,1] (Garcia and
Tugores, 2006). A tourist’s utility is defined as a function of both his or her
perceived experience and the package cost: ui = v + θsi – pi,i∈{L,E}, (Keane,
1997; Dumrongsiri et al, 2006). v is a basic utility of the package tour and
is homogeneous among all tourists. If the utility is lower than zero, tourists
will stay at home or join other forms of tourism, so they will not purchase
any of the two package tours. Thus, if the tourists’ preferences fall within
θ∈[0,^θ], the demand for either of the package tours would not be zero [where
^θ = (pE – v/sE)]. A tourist will be indifferent between the luxury and the economy
package tours if and only if uL = uE or when θ* = (pL – pE)/(sL – sE). To sum
up, the demand function for the luxury package tour is
                    pL    pEDL = 1 – θ* = 1 – –– + –– (1)
                       
∆S    ∆S
while the demand function for the economy package tour is
               v     pL    1    1DE = θ* – 
^θ = –– + –– – (–– + ––)pE (2)
                 
sE       ∆S     ∆S    sE
Stackelberg equilibrium
This section considers an unbalanced tourism market in which HKD leads the
package holiday market over the tour operator. The market structure is
especially valid for the park industry in mainland China where no true world-
class amusement parks exist except for HKD. With many exciting rides and
operated by the world famous corporation, HKD is extremely attractive to
Chinese tourists. Compared with HKD, tour operators normally face fierce
competition from a large number of competitors operating in mainland China.
A single tour operator could hardly influence the total volume of tourists. In
such a circumstance, a leader–follower relationship as a sequential game is valid,
where HKD is a leader making its first move and the tour operator as a follower
makes its move in response to the action taken by HKD.
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The strategic moves or decision variables of HKD include the wholesale
prices of the combined and the admission-only tickets: wL and wE. Let c and
cTH be the unit costs of the park and its hotels, respectively. The profit of HKD
is
πTP(wL,wE) = DL(wL – cTH – c) + DE(wE – c) (3)
The decision variables for the tour operator consist of the prices of the luxury
and the economy package tours: pL and pE. Because the accommodation of the
economy package tour is arranged with an external hotel, the unit cost is,
therefore, cEH. In order to keep the model simple, we further assume the unit
operational cost of the tour operator is zero because it is a constant and
disappears when deriving differentials in the equation. The conclusions of this
paper, nonetheless, still hold if non-zero unit operational cost is considered in
the analysis. Consequently, the profit of the tour operator is
πTO(pL,pE) = DL(pL – wL) + DE(pE – wE – cEH) (4)
The game is solved by backward induction. For the tour operator, the problem
is to determine the optimal prices of the luxury and the economy package tours
in order to maximize its profit.
Max πTO(pL,pE) = DL(pL – wL) + DE(pE – wE – cEH) (5)
The following proposition shows the optimal decisions of the tour operator.
Proposition 1. Given the prices offered by HKD, wL and wE, the tour operator’s
profit is joint concave in pL and pE. The optimal prices of the tour operator are
     v + wL + sL        v + wE + sE + cEHpL = –––––––––– , pE = ––––––––––––––– . (6)
          2                      2
Proof. The Hessian matrix of πTO is a negative definite because
∂2πTO      2–––– = – –– < 0 ,
 ∂p2L       ∆S
∂2πTO        1    1–––– = – 2(–– + ––) < 0 and
 ∂p2E         ∆S    sE
∂2πTO  ∂2πTO        ∂2πTO      4–––– –––– – (––––––)2 = ––– > 0 .
 ∂p2L     ∂p2E      ∂pL∂pE      sE∆S
Take the first derivations of πTO respective to pL and pE and combine the two
equations
∂πTO–––– = 0
 ∂pL
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and
∂πTO–––– = 0 ,
 ∂pE
the result could be achieved.
The result is very intuitive. The prices of the package tours are related
positively to the utilities, the experience and the cost variables. Substituting
these prices back into Equation (3) yields the following optimization problem
for HKD:
                 (wE – wL + ∆S + cEH)(wL – cTH – c)Max πTP(wL,wE) = ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– +
                                2∆S
 v – wE – sE – cEH    wL – wE + ∆S – cEH(––––––––––––––– + ––––––––––––––––)(wE – c) (7)        2SE                   2∆S
Solving Equation (7) for wL and wE, and substituting them into Equation (6),
we have a unique equilibrium shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The Stackelberg equilibrium (w*L,w
*
E,p
*
L,p
*
E) is as follows:
     v + sL + cTH + c         v + sE – cEH + cw*L = –––––––––––––– , w
*
E = –––––––––––––– . (8)             2                       2
    3v + 3sL + cTH + c       3v + 3sE + cEH + cp*L = ––––––––––––––– , p
*
E = ––––––––––––––– . (9)             4                        4
The equilibrium profits of HKD and the tour operator are, respectively
            (v + sE – cEH – c)
2   (∆S – ∆C)2
π*TP = 2π
*
TO = –––––––––––––– + –––––––, where ∆C = cTH – cEH . (10)                    8sE             8∆S
The market demands for the two package tours and the total demand are given
as
     1   ∆C          ∆C    v – cEH – c          v + sE – cEH – cD*L = – – ––– , D*E = ––– + –––––––– , D*Total = ––––––––––––– . (11)     4   4∆S               4∆S             4sE                    4sE
In order for D*L > 0, it is necessary that ∆S > ∆C. The proof of Proposition 2
is similar to that of Proposition 1, thus omitted.
The equilibrium is a set of pricing strategies in which both players have no
incentive to change their prices unilaterally. The proposition shows that the
basic utility and the experience variables have positive impact on the
equilibrium prices. The price of the admission-only ticket decreases when the
price of the external hotel rises because of the complementary effect. As seen
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in Equation (10), HKD gains twice as much profit as that of the tour operator
due to its dominant position. Most importantly, the profit functions of the two
parties are similar, implying that their interests are consistent and are
influenced by the same factors. Equations (10) and (11) show that the total
volume of the package tours influences the profits of HKD and the tour
operator directly. As a result, they are motivated to cooperate in order to
increase the basic utility of tourists, reduce the unit operational cost of the park,
press the external hotels to reduce their prices and make the prices of the hotels
of HKD more competitive.
In practice, however, HKD does not necessarily know in advance exactly how
many tourists will book into its hotels. Given the fixed room numbers, it is
profitable for HKD to maximize the occupancy rate of its hotels. Therefore,
HKD requires tour operators to sell more luxury package tours to tourists. But
the tour operators often find it hard to finish the contractual tasks set by HKD,
due to insufficient market demand for the luxury package tour. In order to
increase the market demand for the luxury package tour, an implication, based
on Equation (11), is that HKD needs to enhance tourists’ experience in its
hotels through improving service quality, offering unique services and reducing
the unit operation cost of its hotels relative to that of the external hotels.
Coordination
Both HKD and the tour operator are self-interested and autonomous entities
that are concerned primarily with optimizing their own objectives. Therefore,
the actions taken by each individual player may not lead to superior performance of
the whole supply chain. For example, HKD would like to raise the ticket prices
in order to gain more profit. However, increased ticket prices actually lead to
high operational costs for the tour operator, who has to increase the prices of
the package tours in order to maintain its revenue income. The increase in
package tour prices prevents some tourists from purchasing their products.
Consequently, the market demand for both HKD and the tour operator is
reduced.
Therefore, it is important for HKD to develop a pricing mechanism which
simultaneously can achieve two objectives: first, both HKD and the tour
operator achieve better pay-offs; and second, the total welfare (profit) of this
tourism system is maximized. If both objectives are accomplished, we say that
HKD and the tour operator coordinate fully with each other.
Coordination through integration
One extreme supply chain coordination strategy is that all enterprises are
integrated as a single decision-making body that shares the same objective
function and seeks a global optimization. When HKD and the tour operator
are integrated, the following formula shows the total profit with respect to the
two prices of the package tours:
Max πIN(pL,pE) = DL(pL – cTH – c) + DE(pE – cEH – c) (12)
Proposition 3 presents the optimal solution of the integrated system.
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Proposition 3. The profit for the integrated system πIN is joint concave in pL and
pE. The optimal prices, pL
IN and pE
IN, are, respectively, defined as
     v + sL + cTH + c         v + sE + cEH + cpL
IN = –––––––––––––– , pE
IN = –––––––––––––– . (13)
             2                       2
The market demands for the two package tours and total demand are,
respectively
      ∆S – ∆C          ∆C    v – cEH – c          v + sE – cEH – cDLIN = –––––– , DEIN = ––– + ––––––––– , DINTotal = ––––––––––––– .        2∆S                 2∆S              2sE                    2sE (14)
The optimal total profit for the whole system is
     (∆S – ∆C)2    (v + sE – cEH – c)2
π*IN = –––––––– + ––––––––––––––– . (15)        4∆S              4sE
The proof of Proposition 3 is similar to that of Proposition 1, thus omitted.
In the Stackelberg game model, HKD and the tour operator are competitive
and make their pricing decision independently. The total profit for the
disintegrated system π* is defined as
π* = π*TP(w
*
L,w
*
E) + π
*
TO(p
*
L,p
*
E). (16)
The following proposition summarizes the relationship between the integrated
and leader–follower systems.
Proposition 4. (i) ∆π = π*IN – π* = π*TO > 0; (ii) p*L > pLIN and p*E > pEIN;
(iii) DL
IN > D*L, DE
IN > D*E, D
IN
Total > D
*
Total; (iv) ∆π increases with ∆S.
Proposition 4 suggests that the integrated system is more efficient than the
disintegrated one as the total profit of HKD and the tour operator is higher
in the integrated system than that in the disintegrated system. The potential
profit increase through integration provides an incentive for HKD to form a
collaborative partnership with the tour operator. This collaboration will result
in an increase in the demand for both luxury and economy package tours. The
lower prices offered by the tour operator in the integrated system will attract
more tourists to purchase the package tours. We also notice that the
performance of the disintegrated system is far from the optimal system solution
due to the increasing difference of tourists’ experience. Therefore, coordination
is very important for both HKD and the tour operator.
Coordination through quantity discount
Quantity discount, as a traditional market strategy in practice, stems from the
fact that product/service supplier discount offers can influence buyers’
purchasing behaviour by providing economic incentives (Shin and Benton, 2007).
This strategy is popular with tourism product/service suppliers in the tourism
industry (Campo and Yagüe, 2007).
In the following analysis, we focus on HKD’s quantity discount strategy and
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examine whether this strategy could provide beneficial coordination between
the two players. Proposition 5 shows the results of our game model.
Proposition 5. HKD can coordinate the tour operator by offering a quantity
discount with the following unit prices
wL = βv + (1 – β)(cTH + c) + βsL(1 – qL) – βsEqE (17)
wE = β(v – cH) + (1 – β)c + βsE(1 – qL – qE) (18)
where qL and qE are quantities demanded for the two packages and β∈[0,1].
Proof. For the tour operator, the total number of package tours sold equals the
market demand for its product. Substituting qL and qE by DL and DE, we have
wL = βpL + (1 – β)cTH + (1 – β)c,  wE = βpE – βcEH + (1 – β)c.
Thus, the tour operator maximizes its profit, given the prices of the two
products offered by HKD. That is Max πTO(pL,pE) = (1 – β)πIN. The objective
of the tour operator is the same as that of the integrated system. Therefore,
they have the same solution.
This result suggests that HKD could coordinate the tour operator through
a quantity discount schedule. Under this schedule, the tour operator will take
the market prices of the package tours in the integrated system as its own
prices. As a result of this coordination, the profits of HKD and the tour operator
are βπ*IN and (1 – β)π*IN, respectively. Therefore, the parameter, β, represents the
profit share of HKD within the integrated system.
In fact, HKD has been using the quantity discount price strategy to
encourage tour operators to sell more HKD packages. Meanwhile, HKD has
also imposed many restrictions on the implementation of the pricing strategy
from its opening. For example, in order to ensure the occupancy rate of its
hotels, HKD had requested the tour operators who wanted to take the quantity
discount of the admission-only package to sell at least a certain percentage of
the combined package. If the tour operators want to sell just the admission-
only ticket, they will not receive any quantity discount. This restriction works
well for some market segments and the proportion of the combined package
could be determined easily based on Equation (11), that is
     DL
IN
η = –––– .
     DE
IN
However, for some market segments, especially for tourists from less developed
areas, the cost of the package tour is still the dominant factor that affects their
purchasing decisions. For such market segments, the experience gained from
staying in the HKD hotels does not compensate the negative effect of the price
increase, that is
                   ∆S + ∆C∆S ≤ pLIN – pEIN = ––––––– .
                    2
Therefore,
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         ∆S + ∆CDLIN = –––––––  < 0
          2∆S
and this implies that the demand for the luxury package tours will be zero.
In realizing this limitation, HKD subsequently dropped this practice.
In the Stackelberg game, the equilibrium profits of HKD and the tour
operator are π*TP and π
*
TO. If the quantity discount is accepted by both players,
it must first satisfy βπ*IN ≥ π*TP and (1 – β)π*IN ≥ π*TP. Thus, we have
1    π*TP            π
*
TO    3–– = ––– ≤ β ≤ 1 – ––– = –– .
2    π*IN            π
*
IN    4
This suggests that HKD will take about three-quarters of the increased profit,
while the tour operator will have a cut of less than one half of the increased
profit.
Nash bargaining result
In order to determine the profit share of HKD, β, in the quantity discount
schedule, we follow the standard Nash bargaining model (Nash, 1950). HKD
and the tour operator’s preferences for the shares of the system profit increase
are defined as ∆πTP and ∆πTO, where ∆πTP + ∆πTO = ∆π. These preferences are
represented by the utility functions uTP(∆πTP) and uTO(∆πTO). In the bargaining
model, HKD and the tour operator are assumed to maximize the following
objective function jointly:
Max [uTP(∆πTP)]α[uTP(∆πTP)]β (19)
st. ∆πTP + ∆πTO = π*IN – (πTP + πTO)
where α and β denote the bargaining power. Like Pan (2006), we assume that
a player’s utility is equal to its objective, as the utilities of HKD and the tour
operator are the final profit shares after bargaining. Thus, Equation (19) is
rewritten as
Max (∆πTP)a(∆πTO)]b (20)
st. ∆πTP + ∆πTO = π*IN – (πTP + πTO)
Solving the above model for ∆πTP and ∆πTO yields the bargaining result, which
is given in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. The profit share of HKD, β, in the quantity discount schedule
obtained by Nash bargaining is
     3       aβ = –– – ––––––– .
     4    4(a + b)
HKD and the tour operator split the increased system profit according to
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   a              b
–––––– ∆π and –––––– ∆π.
(a + b)         (a + b)
This proposition illustrates that if HKD and the tour operator have the same
degree of bargaining power, they should share the system profit gains equally,
that is, ∆π/2, and the parameter β in the quantity discount schedule is
β = 5/8. However, in our analysis, HKD as a core attraction for tourists is
assumed to have a dominant power over the tour operator. Therefore, the
bargaining power of HKD is higher than that of the tour operator. This
suggests that HKD will receive a higher share of the system profit growth, as
is shown in the proposition when a > b.
With the fast growth in the tourism industry in mainland China, tour
operators are playing an ever-increasing role in facilitating the demand for
international travel by Chinese residents. More and more Chinese tourists are
now taking their holidays through package tours. In the first year, HKD missed
its attendance target of 5.6 million by 400,000. As a result, HKD lost about
HK$363 million in sale revenue. This enables the tour operator to increase its
bargaining power over HKD. According to Proposition 6, the increase in the
tour operator’s bargaining power will increase its profit shares and the higher
quantity discount when negotiating with HKD. That explains why HKD has
increased the quantity discount twice in June and July 2006, respectively.
Concluding remarks
This paper investigates the competition and coordination between HKD and
a tour operator using game theory. HKD sells both admission-only and
combined tickets to the tour operator. The latter then packages the products
of HKD with other activities and sells the two package tours to the target
markets. In the leader–follower relationship, HKD dominates the market.
A sequential Stackelberg game model is developed to explain the interaction
between HKD and the tour operator. As a leader, HKD first determines the
prices of the two tickets that are offered to the tour operator. The tour operator,
as a follower, then decides the market prices of its package tours, which are
sold to tourists. The game has been solved by the backward induction approach.
The equilibrium solution implies that HKD is likely to make an effort to
attract more tourists to purchase the luxury package tour through enhancing
tourists’ experience in its hotels and reducing the unit operation costs of its
hotels.
The paper also looks at the players’ decisions on the pricing of their products
through coordination. Our finding is that a quantity discount schedule can
achieve the system coordination that maximizes the two players’ profits. The
bargaining result shows that HKD receives a larger share of the system profit
growth than the tour operator. But with an increased bargaining power, the
tour operator’s share of the system profit also increases.
There are two main directions in which further research could be extended.
First, our model is deterministic, which assumes that the market demand is
only affected by the price of the package tours. However, in practice the demand
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can also be affected by other stochastic factors, such as seasonality, economic
condition and even epidemics such as bird flu and SARS. It would be inter-
esting to discuss the impact of such factors on pricing decisions by stochastic
game models. Secondly, this is a theoretical study in the context of HKD and
it would be desirable if some empirical analyses could be carried out to confirm
the theoretical models developed in this paper.
Endnotes
1. For example, the China Youth Travel Service (CYTS, http://www.aoyou.com/), one of the biggest
travel agencies in mainland China, supplies two kinds of Hong Kong package tours to mainland
Chinese tourists. Both packages include a visit to HKD and three night’s accommodation. The
first package tour is known as the ‘Basic HKD Tour’, in which tourists stay at a medium-tariff
hotel for three nights. The second one is called the ‘Premium HKD Tour’, in which tourists
stay at the Disney Hollywood Hotel (a high-tariff hotel) for one night and in a same tariff hotel
that does not belong to HKD for another two nights.
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